We strongly concur with most of Morgan's points regarding expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) for policy making (1); however, we contest the somewhat idealistic tone of Morgan's paper, which we believe counters the goal of better policy making otherwise promoted. Furthermore, we disagree on two specific issues raised by Morgan that can be seen as located within this general criticism: the role of combination and consensus, and the value of the Delphi method.
Although we appreciate the many good arguments noted by Morgan for not producing single probability distributions from EKE, in practice it is usual that just one policy must be selected. Producing single distributions is therefore an unfortunate fact of life; thus, the question becomes, "how can we best produce this single distribution from multiple experts?" There are three basic positions on this: we can average over the experts' judgments; we can allow interacting experts to reach a consensus; or we can use some mixture of the first two approaches. Which of these methods is "best" is a matter of debate; however, the answer probably depends on the nature of the experts and the elicitation task.
The Delphi procedure is a mixed method that uses restricted interactions between experts, with averaging to produce a final summary position. Morgan quotes two reviews of Delphi that conclude the method leads to false consensus based on pressure to conform rather than true agreement. Although we acknowledge that conformity pressures persist in Delphi despite the anonymity designed to eliminate them (2), they are less than in freely interacting groups used by many EKE methods, and are further reduced if certain Delphi adaptations are used, in particular, feeding back detailed rationales for judgments (3).
The more recent of the Delphi reviews cited by Morgan (1) was published in 1991. Since then there has been much research that shows that Delphi usually produces more accurate assessments than freely interacting groups, and refines both the method and the underlying theory (see ref. 4 for a recent review). We argue that the Delphi method fulfills Morgan's (1) criteria for EKE procedures: it has a strong research base and uses systematic, iterative procedures to maximize the quality of judgment and reduce biases, which together reduce the likelihood of negative reputational effects. Delphi also allows diversity of opinion to be represented-as Morgan requires-and reconciled if rationales are fed back, but has the important practical advantage of not requiring faceto-face or real-time expert interaction.
Ideally, policy making should be based on well-grounded scientific data, but frequently such data are not available. If we are overly strict we do not make policy until we have scientific data (Scylla); if we are overly lax then we make policy without reference to the scientific community at all (Charybdis). EKE is a means of steering a course between these two extremes. We argue that Morgan's (1) characterization of EKE is too strict, and if this course is followed, because policies must be made, rather than hitting Scylla we will be dragged down by Charybdis. Compromises must be made: experts must be found and polled even if they are geographically dispersed, and consensus must be reached despite differences in opinion. Delphi permits both of these things to be achieved while holding true to the other important principles of EKE highlighted by Morgan. 
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